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Introduction
China is the world's largest ongoing experiment in a form of regime-authoritarianism-that is supposed to be in global decline. 1 It accounts for 58 percent of the world's population that Freedom House considers as living under an "unfree" regime. Unlike most of the world's authoritarian regimes, which pretend or promise to deliver democracy, the ruling CCP explicitly rejects "Western-style" democracy as a suitable political system for China. This makes the country an object of particular fascination to students of comparative politics.
Comparativists have long associated authoritarian regimes with two main flaws: a lack of institutionalization and a lack of legitimacy. 2 China has provided evidence of both; hence it is fundamentally challenging old assumptions about the nature and stability of authoritarian regimes.
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Griffith University conference "The Search for Legitimacy:
Managing the Political Consequences of Asian Development", National University of Singapore, June 2009. 2 In the context of this paper, legitimacy is defined according to the seminal work of David Beetham (1991) . According to Beetham, "power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that (i) it conforms to established rules (conventional and/or constitutional-legal), (ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate, and (iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate" (Beetham 1991: 16; cf. Gilley 2009: 8) . For a discussion of the use of legitimacy concepts in nondemocratic contexts, cf. Holbig (forthcoming).
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Holbig/Gilley: In Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China Crucial to the contemporary study of the durability of the CCP regime is the question of popular legitimacy. While a debate exists about the relative importance of institutional versus legitimacy-based sources of regime durability in China, there is a broad consensus that the current regime in China enjoys relatively robust legitimacy across the population. Most also agree that the erosion of that legitimacy would have grave consequences, not just directly but also indirectly through the erosion of the institutional sources of regime stability themselves (internal party discipline, control of the media, co-optation of the middle class, etc.).
In popular discussions, and even in many academic ones, the reasons for regime legitimacy in China are typically reduced to two main factors: economic growth and nationalism. "China's regime retains authority by means of patriotism and performance-based legitimacy," says Roskin (2009: 426) . Pan writes that "The government has grown expert at […] rallying nationalist sentiment to its side […] [while] the extended boom has enhanced the party's reputation" ( Pan 2008: 323) . Laliberté and Lanteigne write that the CCP's claims to legitimacy, "in a nutshell, are encapsulated in the notion that only the CCP is able to ensure economic growth, provide social stability, and defend national sovereignty" (Laliberté and 2) governance, including the ways in which the regime has been able to define democracy and rights in terms of rational-legal governance, internal security and stability, and socioeconomic freedoms.
We do not challenge the importance of growth and of nationalism. However, we believe that they are insufficient to explain the legitimation of the CCP regime. The key to understanding the party's search for legitimacy, we believe, lies in analyzing its ability to construct and influence the subjective values and meanings against which its performance is measured.
There has been a clear shift in emphasis in Chinese elites' approach to relegitimating the post-revolutionary regime: from the economic-nationalistic approach of the early reform period to the ideological-institutional approach of recent years. It is little surprise, then, that "party building," which includes both ideological and institutional dimensions, is a central aspect of legitimation strategies.
After a brief outline of the historical dimension of the CCP's legitimacy and a discussion of the various levels of legitimacy in China, the paper will analyze the various sources of Holbig/Gilley: In Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China 7 legitimacy. By focusing on developments during the reform period and particularly during the last decade, it aims to elaborate on the relative importance of these sources over time as well as on their inherent dilemmas and limitations.
Legitimacy in History
The legitimacy of the CCP has always been contested and often explicitly rejected by significant portions of China's population. The civil war that preceded the CCP's victory in 1949 reflected a profoundly divided population. terson calls "one of the largest refugee flows in world history" (Peterson 2008: 172) .
Within the country, rebel counterinsurgencies continued until 1951 in Han areas. Anti-CCP insurgents captured 31 of 79 county capitals in the southwest province of Guizhou in 1950 before finally being crushed in "bandit suppression" campaigns by the end of 1951 (Brown 2007: 114) . Tibet and Xinjiang were subdued by force.
It is generally assumed (though elusive to prove) that in its earliest years, from 1949 to 1956, the PRC successfully established its legitimacy through revolutionary ideology and myths, and through concrete performance-ending civil conflict, controlling inflation, and rebuilding the economy. With the excesses of the anti-rightist campaign of 1956, increasing inner-party conflict, and then the disastrous Great Leap Famine of [1959] [1960] [1961] , that legitimacy began to ebb (although ironically, one Chinese scholar still argues today that the party launched the Great Leap Forward to restore its legitimacy) (Deng 2009 then it is not inconceivable that we will follow the same path as the Soviet Union. (Zhou 2006: 250-1) Shambaugh calls the 2004 decision "probably the most important" party document since the 1978 plenum decision that launched the reform movement (Shambaugh 2008: 124) .
In the following years an intensive debate emerged among the party's intellectuals on the explicit question of legitimacy. The number of articles discussing party legitimacy in a representative sample of 36 party-school journals rose from just 14 in 2002 to a peak of 84 in 2006 (Gilley 2008) . Only a few scattered voices among the hard-line party ideologues pointed out that Marxist parties should by definition not be debating their own legitimacy because "raising the question of whether China should still be led by the CCP" could have "serious negative consequences" (Xin 2005) . This debate in turn has provided the basis for a constant and restless quest to adjust, change, modify, and sometimes radically alter aspects of public policy and state institutions in order to conform to the perceived demands of legitimacy.
Wang Shaoguang has talked about a new "popular pressures" model of policy making in China that has resulted in "an impressive congruence between the priorities of the public and the priorities of the Chinese government" (Wang 2008: 81) . The search for legitimacy is at the center of contemporary Chinese politics.
The concern with legitimacy parallels similar concerns in other post-revolutionary communist states, especially those in Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.
Toma and Völgyes wrote that after the break with despotism in 1956 in Hungary, "legitimacy [...] became a primary goal" of the political system, first through nationalism and economic growth and later through political participation and social freedoms (Toma and Völgyes 1977: 19) . What sets the CCP apart, we believe, is its refusal to abandon ideological legitimation in the face of globally dominant liberal values, and its success in institutionalizing many aspects of the global "good governance" agenda without ceding power to social actors.
Legitimacy Levels
Most measurements find that in the post-Tiananmen period, the party succeeded in rebuilding its popular legitimacy. Gilley (Gilley 2006) , using both attitudinal and behavioral data at the aggregate level, finds that China was a "high legitimacy" state from a comparative perspective in the late 1990s to early 2000s, ranking thirteenth out of 72 states considered, and second in Asia only to Taiwan. Other quantitative measures report similar results (Chen 2004; Wang 2005 ).
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Such findings are based on mean-centered models of measurement. However, the CCP's own attempts to measure its legitimacy, like those of the GDR or of Stalin himself, tend towards a more disaggregated microlevel approach that is more concerned with variance.
Based upon how it deals with seemingly insignificant "mass incidents" and how it studies their potential effects, the CCP appears to look for nodes of legitimacy crisis, in both social and geographic spaces, perhaps based on the view that delegitimation can occur quickly as a result of "mass incidents" or other forms of mass mobilization triggering a cascade of preference shifts (Zhang 2009 ). According to this alternative approach, legitimacy is not a single continuous variable with a mean value whose implications can be linked in a linear manner to the probability of system-threatening behavior. Rather, it is a cluster of variables whose means and variances can be linked in a Bayesian or "fuzzy set" manner of conditional probabilities to system-threatening behavior. The notion is that different combinations of factors with different critical values might interact to suddenly and radically alter the overall level of legitimacy, causing system-threatening events. The Falun Gong protest movement of 1999, for instance, was such a node of delegitimation, one that the party crushed with unexpected venom. The wife of former CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin commented that his desk was covered in reports of behaviors that might be considered evidence of legitimacy deficits: "Explosions here, rioting there. Murders, corruption, terrorism-little that was nice" ).
The data sets used to measure legitimacy in China are both attitudinal (answers to questions about trust, support, or satisfaction with the regime and its institutions) and behavioral (tax payments, voting rates, political violence, nationalist demonstrations, etc.) (Gilley 2006) . In authoritarian systems, behavioral indicators might be weighted more heavily in any overall evaluation of legitimacy given the problem of insincere answers to survey questions. In Hungary, Kadar believed that "legitimacy depended upon the voluntary participation of a majority of citizens [...] in order to stimulate a positive response on the part of the citizenry" (Toma and Völgyes 1977: 32) .
In China, sky-high attitudinal indicators are offset by much lower behavioral indicators-meaning that citizens invest themselves in the state much less through their deeds than through their words. Turnouts in village and urban district direct elections and the willingness to pay income taxes both reveal only moderate legitimacy in a cross-national comparison. Gilley (Gilley 2009 ) refers to this phenomena as "hidden discontent" and has found that China had one of the largest gaps of the 72 countries studied. In addition, in a country the size of China one must engage in substantive geographical (which region?), institutional (which institutions?), and popular (which groups?) complexification. Gunter Schubert argues that in order to assess the Communist regime's overall legitimacy "it is first of all necessary to disaggregate the Chinese political system (or state) and look at the potential 'zones of legitimacy' at different spatial, administrative and personal levels" (Schubert 2008: 196 The second is then the objective and empirical analysis of these factors, relying not on individual-level correlational analysis but on macrolevel correlational analysis, where a factor can be said to be more legitimating when its objective presence is associated with objectively higher legitimacy or where its objective presence correlates with macrolevel social attitudes. We might think of this as mainly concerning the successes or failures of various legitimation strategies. The questions relevant here are as follows: How important is a certain factor as a source of legitimacy? How has it varied over time in both delivery and importance? What are the likely challenges of delivering this in future and of its future importance to the legitimation process?
The Conundrum of Economic Growth
Growth and nationalism, as mentioned, are widely cited among outside analysts as the main sources of legitimacy in China. No doubt, as the WVS question shows, they matter. But the WVS data also shows that they are probably declining in importance, and both face inherent dilemmas.
There is a view widely shared among analysts in China (e.g., Kang 1999 , Xu and Yang 2005 , Long and Wang 2005 ) that economic growth in particular, while providing a short-term fillip to party legitimacy, was, like revolutionary legitimacy, bound to be exhausted. This is because it generates its own problems (inequalities, environmental degradation, etc.); because it creates rising expectations; and because it fuels shifts in social values and political culture. Indeed, Chinese elites have worried for years about the fleeting nature of economic success, which is aggravated by the increasing dependence on the global market. Samuel
Huntington's "King's dilemma" (Huntington 1970: 177), translated as "performance dilemma"
(zhengji kunju), was borrowed by Chinese scholars as the starting point for a critical analysis of the first two decades of economic reforms. These scholars argued that party rule would come under growing pressure as the satisfaction of material needs would breed immaterial ones, such as demands for political participation and pluralization, and as social inequalities fuelled a sense of injustice (Gilley and Holbig 2009 ).
The relationship between growth and regime legitimacy is not an obvious one. Economic growth and material well-being are highly abstract notions for the individual, notions which are usually experienced by way of intertemporal, interpersonal, interregional and international comparison. This is to say, economic success is not per se a source of regime legitimacy; instead, it has to be framed in ways conducive to positive subjective perceptions of the regime, so that the latter is seen as, for example, competent, efficient, fair, committed to the realization of the common interest while avoiding publicly manifest partiality or bias, aware of social woes and arranging for compensation of the less affluent, capable of selectively embracing the benefits of globalization while defending national interests on a complex international terrain, and so on. By the same logic, economic crises should not be regarded as an immediate threat to regime legitimacy, bringing down autocrats once the growth falls-again, the emergence of legitimacy deficits depends on how the crisis is framed by the incumbent regime.
The Chinese elites' reaction to the recent global financial and economic crisis is a striking example of the role of framing. When the financial crisis hit the US economy and started to spread across regional markets, Chinese economists initially put forward a "decoupling thesis." Supported by various international commentators, they argued that China, thanks to the leadership's earlier, wise reluctance to fully liberalize its financial market, banking system and the exchange rate regime, had maintained sound finances and would not easily fall prey to the global crisis. Scholars from the "New Left" who gloated that the collapse of Wall Street highlighted the shortcomings of American-style capitalism were well received (Zheng and Lye 2008) .
When the global economic crisis eventually hit China in September 2008 via a sharp decline in Western demand for Chinese exports, the financial authorities were quick to signal their resoluteness to tackle the crisis by reducing domestic interest rates, reserve ratios, and deposit and lending rates. In the face of the damages to China's coastal export firms, surging job losses, and the ensuing risks of social instability, Wen Jiabao announced a 4 trillion yuan (USD 586 billion) stimulus package in November. This was to be spent for infrastructure projects, reconstruction work in the earthquake-hit regions of Sichuan province, technological innovation, environmental protection, and social welfare measures (Schueller 2009 ). Rhetorically the announcement of the stimulus package was linked to a plea for confidenceaddressed to domestic as well as international audiences-to overcome the crisis of the world market, to heed against protectionism, and to stabilize the domestic market through spending on durable consumer goods at home. The fact that the package was formulated reHolbig/Gilley: In Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China 13 sponsibly and speedily (without having to pass many procedural hurdles) earned the Chinese leadership praise from other developing and emerging countries. Also, thanks to the enormous foreign exchange reserves China had amassed, the huge sum could be earmarked without raising the country's deficit ratio to irresponsibly high levels.
Another leitmotif has been to make use of the crisis as an opportunity to address structural imbalances at home and enhance China's international standing. While most governments around the globe have availed themselves of some version of this "crisis-as-opportunity" rhetoric, the Chinese leadership has particularly emphasized the positive role of the party-state. In his work report to the NPC in March 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao brought home the party's proactive role and the "advantages" of the party regime in dealing with the economic crisis:
Our confidence and strength come from many sources: from the scientific judgment and correct grasp of the situation of the central leadership; from the policies and measures that have been formulated and implemented to respond to challenges and promote long-term development; […] from our unique political and institutional advantages that enable us to mobilize resources to accomplish large undertakings, the stable, harmonious social environment we enjoy, and the enthusiasm and creativity of the whole nation from top to bottom to promote scientific development; and from the powerful spirit of the Chinese nation, which always works hard and persistently to make the country strong.
(Xinhua English translation service, 14.3.2009) Thus, the CCP is aware of both the fleeting and the subjective nature of growth-based legitimation and constantly has to struggle to maintain this source of legitimacy. Not unsurprisingly, it has devoted major efforts to the search for alternative legitimacy sources.
The Double-edged Sword of Nationalism
Nationalism also involves inherent dilemmas. Since the 1990s, anti-Western and anti-Japanese outbursts have occurred repeatedly in the streets of Chinese cities and in the limelight of international media coverage. In the field of Chinese studies, scholars have put down this phenomenon to the growing disenchantment with the West in the wake of the Soviet collapse.
They have discussed how much of this nationalist sentiment is state-sponsored (rooted in the official cultivation of patriotism and national sovereignty instrumentalized by the Chinese party-state as an "ersatz ideology") and how much is popular nationalism (resulting from, among other factors, the uncertainties produced by the pluralization and marketization of social life, ruptures in the process of socialization and the building of personal identities, mounting pressures in the fields of education and employment, and the ensuing sensibility towards nationalistic myths). Most authors agree that present-day nationalism is a complex mixture of both state and popular nationalism, where mechanisms of top-down and bottomup mobilization are closely interrelated (Barmé 1995 , Unger 1996 , Gries 2004 , Zhao 2004 , Link 2008 .
Over decades, the CCP has implanted nationalistic myths in the collective memory which are easily mobilized in periods of external ruptures. The official narrative of the Chinese nation as a "victim" weaves the imperialist aggression of Western powers in the nineteenth century, the cruelties inflicted upon China by Japanese "devils" during the Sino-Japanese war, the chauvinism of a "relentless" post-war Japan, and the condescension of Western countries vis-à-vis China's emerging economic and political power into an endless chain of "humiliations" (He 2007) . As Edward Friedman has argued most trenchantly, in order to safeguard its continued legitimation, the CCP decided in the early 1980s to "cover up" the crimes of the Maoist era, including those of the Cultural Revolution, which involved large portions of the populace not only as victims but also-due to the widespread phenomenon of popular vigilantism-as aggressors. This official strategy of "misremembering the past" has resulted in sublimated forms of an aggressive nationalism and a latent desire for revenge which might flare up even on minor occasions (Friedman 2008 ). Callahan has argued that intellectuals and party workers in China have attributed an imagined "China Threat Theory"
to the West in order to consolidate nationalist identity (Callahan 2006 ).
Due to this complex interplay of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms of mobilization, the leveraging of nationalism as a source of regime legitimacy is an inherently problematic strategy. The Chinese leadership is well aware of this; at least, one hears explicit warnings of the dangers of nationalism from party theorists and prominent scholars. Wan Jun from the Central Party School, for example, regards the resort to nationalism in China as a double-edged sword. While nationalist sentiments may hold positive potential for social mobilization, which could be instrumentalized to overcome a social crisis, they can easily grow out of control and cause a destructive mentality of aggression. Particularly in a multiethnic state such as China, nationalist aspirations may not enhance social cohesion but rather subvert China's fragile national unity. "As we urgently need to throw ourselves into the waves of world-wide economic globalization, we cannot do without the legitimation strategy of nationalism, but we should not use it in a rash manner, and always be very prudent and careful when applying it" (Wan 2003) . Chinese experts on international politics argue that the repeated outbursts of nationalist sentiment in recent years have severely reduced the room to maneuver in China's diplomacy, a factor that has substantially increased the uncertainties of foreign policy making under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
The problematic nature of nationalist strategies of legitimation can be explained by looking at the ambivalent implications of the claim to national sovereignty, which has formed an integral element of political legitimation in all modern nation-states. According to David
Beetham, the claim to national sovereignty substantiates the constitutional rules and normatively validates the political power in a given nation-state by justifying the rightful source of others, and the Southern Weekend Daily and other publications of the Nanfang Media Group, which have been cited widely in international media as pioneers of a liberal, progressive investigative journalism inside China in recent years, are derided as naïve lackeys of Western and "universal values." The "grand vision" which the book outlines instead is that "with Chinese national strength growing at an unprecedented rate, China should stop debasing itself, recognize the fact that it has the power to lead the world and break away from Western influence" (Song Xiaojun et al. 2009 ).
As the above rhetoric reveals, this "New Left" nationalism caters to a chauvinistic and increasingly vengeful nationalism among parts China's urban youth while at the same time formulating trenchant criticisms of the political, intellectual and business elites, who are accused of corruption; egotism; technocratic arrogance; moral decay; and, most viciously, of being blackguards (zei) betraying their country's national interests. Thus, it's not only liberal intellectuals who come under attack but also the "establishment" at large.
The End of the "End of Ideology"
The underlying question of legitimacy is where the common expectations, or evaluative norms, by which legitimacy is judged come from. Since social norms are plural and contested, how do certain ones emerge as dominant? What are the norms that create the sense of political community, the expectations of political culture, and the basis of performance evaluations?
In authoritarian systems, the solution to the problem of normative pluralism is ideology. In communist party regimes, Beetham argues, ideology has to provide the normative foundation for the rightful source of political authority; to define the performance criteria of government, particularly the "common interest" of society and how this goal should be pursued; and to serve as a stimulus to mobilize popular consent or, at least, the assent of political and social elites relevant to legitimizing state power (Beetham 1991 (Beetham , 2001 ).
Contrary to the proposition of an "end of ideology" which allegedly paralleled the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing "end of history", the CCP has never discontinued its reliance on ideology as a crucial source of regime legitimacy (Chen 1995 also Gilley and Holbig 2009 ). However, the answer to these challenges has been to refurbish the old-fashioned image of Marxism and breathe new life into worn-out socialist tenets.
Heeding the words of Deng Xiaoping, who, after the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, reflected that "our biggest mistake was in the area of education, in particular ideological and political education" (Deng 1989 The earliest public mention of the concept, then still without the attribute "scientific," occurred in October the growth-only mentality of the first two decades of economic reforms and instead promised to balance economic development with social and ecological aspects.
This concept was followed closely by another, the "Harmonious Socialist Society", which was innovative in explicitly acknowledging the existence of social tensions and claiming to tackle their root causes, increasingly perceived as a risk to social stability and to the political legitimacy of CCP rule. Hu stated that a "Harmonious Socialist Society" was "essential for consolidating the partyʹs social foundation to govern and achieving the partyʹs historical governing mission" (Renmin Ribao, 27.06.2005) . Industrial College, one of the most prolific writers in contemporary China on party legitimacy, views ideology as the "key factor for public identification with the political authority" (Lu 2005 (Lu , 2006 . Ideology is ascribed numerous positive functions, such as interpreting political order, cementing national identity, mobilizing support, and reducing economic transaction costs by enhancing social trust (Li 2005) . A 2008 article in the journal Qiushi [Seeking Truth], the CCP's top party-theory organ, argued that in China as elsewhere ideology serves as a cohesive force and the "political soul" of parties, being the main instrument for mobilizing support and active commitment to the party's cause. In contrast to past periods of "ideological frenzy", the authors reflect, Chinese people today are no longer assessing their political leaders according to the party's program and principles, but rather according to its capacity and efficiency in solving real social problems. Socialist ideology should not be regarded as signaling only a remote ideal, but as a practical means to satisfy people's actual needs under the conditions of social transformation. The real challenge posed to socialist ideology is the increasing social injustice, which could lead to an identity crisis or even to a legitimacy crisis in China. Therefore, if the party wants to maintain its ideology-based legitimacy, it has to take stringent measures to restore social justice and harmony (Nie and Hu 2008) .
In today's China, efforts to mobilize ideological commitment are focused on political elites, particularly on Communist Party cadres who form the rank and file of the administrative staff at all levels of the party, state and military hierarchies. The ideological commitment of these elites can be used as a test of political loyalty vis-à-vis the regime and publicized as representing the consent of the whole populace based on doctrines of the Communist Party as "vanguard" of the masses.
However popular consent is framed, the multiple tasks that official ideology has to shoulder create an ongoing need for ideological adaptation and reform in order to sustain an "ideological hegemony" (Sun 1995: 16) , which in turn contributes to political and social stability. At the same time, the need for continuous innovation causes a vulnerability particular to socialist systems. Compared to other authoritarian regime types, they are much more easily thrown out of balance once reforms extend beyond the Communist grand tradition and the ruling ideology is unraveled (Gore 2003) . The debate among Chinese party theorists and scholars confirms the precarious role of ideological reform as the Achilles' heel of regime legitimacy, allowing us, in turn, to understand the continuous and enormous investments made by the CCP leadership in order to constantly adapt its ideology to a changing domestic and international environment (Holbig 2009 ).
Culture and its Competing Reinventions
The US scholar Sun Yan argues in her study The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976 Socialism, -1992 that ideology in China has important nationalist and culturalist underpinnings. In the words of Sun, the Chinese concern for ideological and conceptual adaptation is related to the national search for identity and resurrection that has faced the nation since its confrontation with the West in the last century. Not incidentally, the reconceptualization of socialism is frequently linked with the question of "cultural reconstruction"-the reconstruction of Chinese cultural values-in academic and political discussions. (Sun 1995: 18) Culturalism can be identified as an alternative strategy to legitimize party rule in China that has gained increasing currency over the past decade. While the reference here is not the claim to national sovereignty but the claim to represent the legacy of the cultural tradition(s)
of society and, with it, its cultural identity, nationalism and culturalism bear a strong structural similarity in that they are subject to a complex interplay between bottom-up and topdown mechanisms of mobilization. Parallel to the party-state's strategic ambiguity towards nationalist aspirations, we find quite ambivalent attitudes on the part of the CCP leadership However, three other factors included in the institutionalist cluster-the incorporation of new social groups, consultative democracy, and electoral democracy-concern popular input. The concept of "democracy" has been appropriated by the party as a strategy of institutionalization, and the propaganda strategy of using the term "Western-style democracy", as distinguished from "normal democracy", is intended to pave the way for this strategy to succeed. In addition to the well-known and widely established semicompetitive elections at the village level, Zhu Lingjun also describes a variety of direct-election experiments on the part of people's congresses, leadership committees, and the leaders of both government and party at the township and county (or district and city) levels that are expected to uphold legitimacy. Furthermore, the party is experimenting with consultative and deliberative forums where civic leaders, social groups, and commoners are invited to help formulate public policies (Zhu 2006: ch. 8 ). All this is seen by the party as a key source of future legitimacy because it is a way to ensure that the CCP responds to growing social complexity and value shifts. Of course, democracy is not alien to the CCPʹs traditional quest for legitimacy; on the contrary, the claim to popular sovereignty has always been one of the two pillars of the CCPʹs justification of its authority, the other pillar being the scientific doctrine of Leninism.
According to Maria Markus (1982) , it is precisely this combination of bottom-up ("democratic") and top-down (Leninist) legitimacy doctrines which accomplishes the "legitimation of a hierarchically downwards-oriented system of power and command in the name of a 'real' popular sovereignty" (Markus 1982: 84) . Thus, debating democracy in China always means walking the tightrope between socialist and other, competing (liberal, social-democratic, Confucian, etc.) Objectively, institutionalization has increasingly been seen by scholars as a source of legitimacy for the CCP (Yang 2004; Nathan 2003) . Indeed, China tends to be relatively wellgoverned for a country of its income level according to World Bank Institute governance indicators data. In linking democracy to the substantive outcome of popularly perceived good governance, rather than to procedural guarantees, Beijing has reclaimed democracy for its own. As Shi Tianjin (forthcoming) notes, "the regime has been able to define democracy in its own terms, drawing on ideas of good government with deep roots in the nation's historical culture and more recent roots in its ideology of socialism." Do these institutional tactics actually work? Shue (2004) believes that the maintenance of stability and efficient rule has kept the party in power since 1989. One way to keep values focused on governance and stability is to highlight the threats to these things. This is thus the reason the party has been so unexpectedly candid about the rising number of mass protests in recent years or about serious environmental and demographic (aging, sex ratios) problems: to stress the threat of chaos.
There is no doubt that in terms of within-country cases, those places where governance has worsened have experienced greater legitimacy deficits. The legitimacy of the police, for instance, has recovered from its 1990s nadir through professionalization and proceduralization. The more institutionalized local governments, party branches, NGOs (or, more often, government-organized nongovernmental organizations [GONGOs]), media outlets, and noncommunist parties are, the better local governance delivery is, both because the resulting policies and services are better attuned to local demands and because they are better able to meet these demands. Civil society, when it is part of a well-institutionalized and ideologically adaptive state, can support authoritarian rule.
Problems arise, then, when the state suffers a governance-based performance failure. was cited as second only to underdevelopment as a source of legitimacy problems (Zhu 2006:312) . This is a reminder that subjective perceptions of corruption (fuelled by both personal experiences as well as information about objective levels from sources such as the OECD) matter most of all. Corruption has its own indirect corrosive influences on legitimacy by undermining capacity and effectiveness. But its direct impact on legitimacy only occurs if it becomes known and disliked. Beetham(1991) argues that corruption causes legitimacy deficits when it is publicly perceived as clearly favoring particular social groups and thus going against the "common interest."
As for elections, there is considerable debate concerning the legitimating effects of electoral participation in China. China's scholars and party-school researchers express a great deal of interest in the potential of "orderly" political participation as an untapped source of legitimacy (Xia 2008 Moreover, the attitudinal side-benefits that elections might be expected to generate are unclear. One official survey found that 59 percent of urban residents believed that the direct election of residential committees (the same level as villages) was "a mere formality or a sham" (Wang 2002: 169) .
Some outside scholars such as Birney and Kennedy argue that village elections have indeed legitimated the local state in China, but only where the elimination of township interference in the procedures has given them a genuine procedural validity (Kennedy 2009 ). In other words, where "democracy" actually legitimates, it is not the "orderly" democracy managed by top-down Leninist institutions that seeks to govern according to popular wishes but rather the "disorderly" bottom-up democracy in which procedural matters are key. By contrast, Schubert, echoing Wang Shaoguang's argument about democracy as the alignment with popular preferences, argues that it is not the narrow procedural criteria of elections but a broader set of criteria including accountability, value congruence, and political interest through which China's citizens judge (and thus legitimate) their "democracy" (Schubert 2009 ).
The CCP would like to think that it can continue to depend on institutionalization in the future, even as incomes and expectations rise; Singapore is the oft-cited model, but "bureaucratic-authoritarian" Latin America is perhaps a better analogy. Those models show that more efficient, professional, transparent, and consultative institutions alongside effective governance can satisfy demands for voice and participation for a considerable time, consistent with neo-modernization theory. Indeed, China's value trajectory in the Inglehart/Welzel studies shows an unusually high emphasis on rational-legal rule and an unusually low emphasis on individual empowerment for a country of its income level (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) .
Finally, it is worth mentioning explicit "liberal" strategies of legitimation. These are rare. Notions of human rights, civil society, the separation of party and government func- Scholars thus approach the question of legitimacy in contemporary China with much trepidation. They want to avoid a teleology of inevitable democratization, but seek also to avoid the equal and opposite teleology of an inevitable authoritarian durability. While legitimation challenges and failures exist, the CCP has so far overcome them. The issue for analysts is to develop predictive models that can identify ex ante when this is no longer true.
In pursuing this goal, we are drawn into the dynamics of CCP survival and are constantly forced to ask questions about social change and state adaptation. Using the lens of legitimacy allows us to focus on all the important issues of contemporary Chinese politics.
